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The strength of the Christian Democrats, 
the weakness of the opposition. 
Germany before the parliamentary elections
Marta Zawilska-Florczuk
The political campaign before Germany’s parliamentary elections to be held on 22 September 
has in all its glory reflected the trends visible during the last four years of the government 
of Chancellor Angela Merkel – the strength of the Christian Democrats, the weakness of the 
opposition and the increasing marginalisation of the coalition partner, the FDP. The CDU/CSU 
remains the most popular political choice in Germany, largely because Angela Merkel has con-
sistently remained the most popular German politician. Everything indicates that the CDU/CSU 
will win the election, even though it has been running a passive campaign and the Chancellor 
herself has been avoiding confrontation, presenting herself as a kind of cross-party represen-
tative of the interests of all social groups. The Christian Democrats’ main competitors, the So-
cial Democrats, have been unable to play to their strengths and present themselves as a serious 
alternative to the CDU/CSU. The Christian Democrats, despite their difficult cooperation with 
the liberal FDP, have declared their willingness to continue doing so during the next parliamen-
tary term. If the numbers make that impossible, and the Social Democrats and the Greens have 
too few votes to be able to form a government, a grand coalition of the Christian Democrats 
and the SPD will be formed in Germany.
The lacklustre electoral campaign gives the im-
pression that there is no desire to change the 
ruling coalition. Also, polls suggest that the Ger-
man public does not want a radical shake-up of 
the forces on the German political scene. This 
is despite the fact that the coalition of Chris-
tian Democrats and liberals, which was initially 
regarded as being bound to succeed because 
of the similarity of the parties’ programmes, 
ironically turned out to be very confrontation-
al. After just a few weeks, a dispute arose be-
tween the liberals and the Christian Democrats, 
and the FDP began to lose support dramatically 
(from over 14% to around 5% now). Conflicts 
between the coalition partners, on matters 
including the protection of personal data and 
European policy, persisted for the entire term. 
As a result, the Chancellor became dependent 
on opposition support in the Bundestag, as in 
the vote on the aid package for Greece, and the 
vote on mechanisms for stabilising the euro. 
Summing up the current term of parliament, 
on the plus side the ruling coalition can point 
to starting the process of transforming energy 
policy, as well as reform of the Bundeswehr (the 
German defence forces). However, they have 
not succeeded in reforming the tax code and 
geriatric nursing.
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The formal side of the election campaign
The campaign started three months before the 
elections, even though it had previously been 
declared that the campaigning season would 
be short. In reality, however, it has been run-
ning at least since the parties’ appointment 
of their individual candidates for the office of 
Chancellor, i.e. the autumn of 2012.
The Federal Election Commission has allowed 
38 parties to participate in the parliamenta-
ry elections.1 As the polls indicate, the only 
groups with hopes of entering the Bundestag 
are those whose members have already been 
in parliament for years – the CDU/CSU, the 
SPD, the Greens, the FDP and the Left Party. 
In 2011-2012, it seemed that the Pirate Party 
would bring a new quality to German politics; 
they succeeded in entering four regional parlia-
ments and for a long time enjoyed support at 
the federal level, with ratings similar to those 
achieved by the Left Party (about 7%). Howev-
er, the success of the party proved to be a tem-
porary phenomenon, which has passed as the 
crisis in its leadership has deepened.
As in previous years, the political parties have 
employed traditional methods of campaign-
ing (rallies, discussions with parliamentary 
candidates, visits by local politicians to small 
businesses, farms, etc.). Debates between the 
CDU and SPD candidates and those of smaller 
parties have also been broadcast by the major 
private and state TV channels. The campaign 
conducted on the Internet, which aims to reach 
out to young people undecided on who to vote 
for, has been increasingly important. At the fore-
front of this is the Pirate Party, which has only 
a small campaign budget (about €400,000). The 
most dynamic election campaign, however, has 
1 In addition to the well-known smaller parties (such as 
the Pirate Party, the Free Voters, Alternative für Deutsch-
land and the nationalist NPD), various groupings will 
stand which have no realistic chance of getting a no-
ticeable number of votes, such as the Animal Protection 
Party, the Party of German Pensioners, and the Party of 
Christian Bible Believers.
been run by the Social Democrats. They have 
the largest budget of all the parties seeking to 
enter the Bundestag (€23 million, compared to 
the CDU’s €20 million)2. 100 days before the 
elections, the Social Democrats’ campaign staff 
launched a blog which scores every move made 
by the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition and keeps a tally 
of their electoral promises3. The Social Demo-
crats are also the only opposition party to have 
presented a shadow cabinet.
The Christian Democrats’ strong position 
under the wings of Angela Merkel...
Declared support for the Chancellor consistent-
ly runs above 50%, which makes her the most 
popular politician in Germany. Merkel is often 
referred to in the media as ‘Mutti’ (mum), and it 
appears that the role she has been given meets 
the expectations of German society. The Chris-
tian Democrats’ high ratings are primarily due 
to Chancellor Merkel’s popularity, and this is 
what the CDU/CSU’s entire campaign has been 
based on. The Christian Democrats have not 
themselves initiated any discussion on issues 
that could determine the outcome of the elec-
tion, and have avoided discrediting the opposi-
tion parties directly. Their campaign has been 
based on presenting the CDU/CSU-FDP govern-
ment’s achievements, and on responding to 




3 For example, the CDU’s election programme appeared 
on the blog before the Christian Democrats officially 
published it.
The Christian Democrats’ high ratings are 
primarily due to Chancellor Merkel’s pop-
ularity, and this is what the CDU/CSU’s 
entire campaign has been based on.
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election campaign has brought positive results 
for the Christian Democrats. Despite the deci-
sions and political events that could have had 
a negative effect on their ratings (such as Ger-
many’s position on the eurozone crisis, reports 
of a subsequent tranche of aid to Greece, and 
the scandal connected to the surveillance of 
Germany by US and UK intelligence), the num-
ber of people declaring themselves ready to 
vote for the CDU/CSU runs at 40%, about 20 
percentage points higher than for the SPD. 
Merkel herself has adopted a campaign posi-
tion which is almost non-partisan; she has been 
making media appearances and meeting voters, 
but has avoided taking any clear positions on 
political disputes or entering any open confron-
tation with her rivals for the post of Chancellor. 
Instead, the CDU’s attacks of the opposition 
have been led by trusted associates, such as the 
Head of the Chancellor’s Office Ronald Pofalla 
(in connection with the surveillance scandal), 
and the defence minister Thomas de Maizière 
(in connection with the failed purchase of the 
Euro Hawk unmanned aircraft). The Chancel-
lor’s behaviour during the campaign is not real-
ly surprising, since Merkel is known for waiting 
to see how events develop, and for only taking 
important decisions when it is inevitable.
... and the impotence of the opposition 
parties
Since the beginning of the campaign, the op-
position parties (particularity the SPD and the 
Greens) have attempted to exploit the govern-
ment’s weaknesses in the political struggle. 
In the initial phase of the election campaign, 
the dominant themes were energy and the 
eurozone crisis. Although these issues should 
have brought the opposition supporters, the 
balance of the opinion polls has not changed. 
This is because despite differences in the de-
tails, most parties agree on the fundamentals: 
the rescue of the euro area through in-depth 
reform in the countries threatened by the crisis, 
and the need to continue the transformation of 
Germany’s energy policy. The Social Democrats 
and the Greens supported Merkel’s European 
policy in the Bundestag votes on the eurozone 
rescue mechanisms, so now they find it difficult 
to portray themselves as any kind of real op-
position in the eyes of potential voters. Despite 
the general belief that the Germans contribute 
most to the stability of the euro area, there has 
not been any notable public support for the 
Alternative für Deutschland party, which was 
established as a form of criticism of the curren-
cy union4. As for energy policy, the Christian 
Democrats have successfully taken over the ar-
guments which belonged to the Greens and the 
Social Democrats before the announcement in 
2011 of the revision of the national energy pol-
icy. The opposition’s allegations – that the proj-
ect has received insufficient financing, that the 
percentage of energy from renewable sources 
in the German energy plan is too small, and 
that the costs have been unevenly distributed – 
have not harmed the CDU/CSU’s poll numbers. 
The Social Democrats and the Greens have also 
tried in their electoral campaigns to exploit the 
surveillance of German telecommunications by 
US and British special forces, as well as the De-
fence Ministry’s expensive failure to purchase 
five Euro Hawk unmanned aircraft. The op-
position succeeded in calling a parliamentary 
commission of inquiry on the Euro Hawk affair, 
which questioned the defence minister Thomas 
de Maizière, a close ally of Merkel. However, the 
4 According to a poll conducted on 1 September 2013 by 
the Emnid research institute, only 3% of those eligible 
voters would vote for the party.
The Social Democrats’ election campaign 
has not had the expected results. This is 
a result of the christian demokrats’ strat-
egy and the lack of charisma of the SPD’s 
candidate for chancellor Peer Steinbrück.
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SPD and the Greens failed to discredit the pol-
icy or the Christian Democrats themselves. The 
commission completed its work, and the issue 
of the Defence Ministry’s mismanagement was 
overshadowed by international issues, includ-
ing reports of another tranche of aid to Greece 
and the debate on military intervention in Syr-
ia. It is these issues which will dominate the fi-
nal phase of the election campaign. While the 
Christian Democrats and the SPD have criticised 
potential military involvement in Syria, a more 
skilful attack on the need to take further funds 
out of the federal budget to help Greece would 
be more likely to harm the CDU/CSU’s populari-
ty in the last stage of the campaign.
The Social Democrats’ election campaign has not 
so far brought the expected results. This is both 
the result of the Christian Democrats’ effective 
strategy based on the popularity of Chancellor 
Merkel, and the lack of charisma of the SPD’s 
candidate for chancellor, Peer Steinbrück. Since 
the beginning of the election campaign he has 
committed gaffes, including criticising the sal-
ary of the Chancellor of Germany as ‘too low’, 
and has a reputation as a rigid bureaucrat, 
which does not bring him much popularity5. In 
addition, the Social Democrats disagree on the 
Agenda 2010 economic reform package, im-
plemented in 2003, which allowed the German 
economy to recover and they cannot take ad-
vantage of this asset in the election campaign.
And after the elections?
A few weeks before the parliamentary elections, 
the Christian Democrats are in the most com-
fortable position. According to the polls, they 
will win the most votes, and they have the most 
coalition options. However, even if someone else 
did become Chancellor, the main assumptions of 
German policy will not change. The priorities of 
the new government will continue to be the fight 
5 Around 30% support at the beginning of September 
2013.
with the eurozone crisis and the energy policy. 
According to public opinion polls taken on 
10 September, the Christian Democrats (40%), 
the Social Democrats (25%), the Greens (11%), 
the FDP (5%) and the Left Party (9%) will enter 
the Bundestag. The latter group has no chance 
of forming a coalition, as the other parties have 
renounced cooperation with it at the federal 
level, due either to policy differences (the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Liberals) or personal 
issues (the Social Democrats)6. The CDU/CSU 
has the most comfortable negotiating position. 
Arithmetically, it can form three different vari-
ants of coalition: with the FDP, the SPD, and the 
Greens. If the FDP manages to cross the 5% elec-
toral threshold, and the Christian Democrats 
maintain or increase their lead over the other 
parties, the present coalition is likely to contin-
ue after the elections. Government in coalition 
with the FDP revealed significant differences of 
views (including the rescue of the euro area and 
the protection of personal data), but the dra-
matically lower support for the liberal party has 
weakened their position, while strengthening 
the Christian Democrats’ position in the forma-
tion of a new government. Unlike in 2009, the 
CDU has not stated in its electoral manifesto 
that the FDP is its preferred coalition partner7, 
6 The Left Party was founded in 2007, including on the 
basis of the WASG protest movement created by a split 
in the SPD.
7 Unlike in 2009, the Christian Democrats have clearly em-
phasised the importance of casting both votes (for the 
candidate directly and for the party list) for the CDU/CSU. 
Chancellor Merkel has called for this in the party’s TV com-
mercials, and also stressed it during a televised debate with 
Peer Steinbrück. In previous elections, many people delib-
erately voted for the FDP (the party list votes decide the 
distribution of seats in the Bundestag) to allow a coalition 
between the Christian Democrats and the liberals.
If the numbers do not favour a CDU/CSU-
-FDP coalition, the most realistic scenario 
is a grand coalition between the Christian 
Democrats and the SPD.
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but Chancellor Merkel has expressed a desire to 
continue cooperation with the liberals after the 
election. The FDP has clearly emphasised that 
they are not interested in any other coalition. 
If there are not enough parliamentary seats to 
recreate the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, the most 
realistic scenario is a grand coalition between 
the Christian Democrats and the SPD. This is the 
preferred option for 44% of poll respondents8. 
The Christian Democrats/Social Democrats 
government in 2005-2009 ran smoothly and 
without major conflicts. The Christian Demo-
crats have not dissociated themselves from this 
possibility, as indicated by the moderate tone 
of the pre-election TV debate between Merkel 
and Steinbrück. Nor have the Social Democrats 
ruled out this scenario. Cooperation with the 
Christian Democrats, however, carries the risk 
of weakening the SPD; it would definitely be the 
junior partner in any coalition government with 
the CDU/CSU. Besides, the Christian Democrats’ 
skilful takeover of subjects previously reserved 
to the Social Democrats (such as social policy) 
reflected negatively on the SPD’s poll ratings 
after the grand coalition came to an end9. For 
this reason, the Social Democrats would be 
more comfortable working with the Greens, 
as they did in 1998-2002. It is possible that 
the Christian Democrats would also undertake 
coalition negotiations with the Green Party. 
A government of these parties would be un-
8 According to a survey conducted in July 2013 on behalf 
of ARD television, such a government would be consid-
ered best by 44% of Germans, and 46% believe the cur-
rent shape of the government would be best.
9 In the parliamentary elections in 2009, the SPD received 
the worst result in its history, a mere 23% of the vote.
precedented at the federal level, although the 
CDU and the Greens have already governed to-
gether in Hamburg in 2008-2010. These parties 
certainly would find a common language on 
issues related to energy and the environment, 
which would facilitate the implementation of 
the energy transformation policy. However, 
their differences in general political outlook, es-
pecially on fiscal policy, would make such a co-
alition very unlikely because of the opposition 
each party would face from within. The distri-
bution of power in the Bundesrat, the chamber 
of parliament in which representatives of the 
federal states (Länder) sit, will be important for 
the coalition negotiations. Currently, the Social 
Democrats and the Greens have an absolute 
majority that allows them to block bills pro-
posed by the federal government. In this case, 
an SPD/Green coalition would therefore be 
most likely to implement reforms smoothly. In 
this respect the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition would 
be in the most difficult situation. Also, a grand 
coalition would not have the needed number 
of votes in the Bundesrat; it could only count 
on the support of states in which the Christian 
Democrats or the SPD govern singlehandledly, 
or in those already run by grand coalitions be-
tween the two. Federal states ruled by the gov-
ernment parties in coalition with another part-
ner usually abstain from voting. The balance 
of power will not be changed by the elections 
to the parliaments of Bavaria and Hesse (on 15 
and 22 September).
Regardless of which parties create the new coa-
lition, the principal directions of German policy 
will be maintained. European matters and the 
continuation of the energy transformation pol-
icy will be the most important problems in the 
2013-2017 term. In the case of European policy, 
the future government will continue to favour 
fighting the debt crisis by emphasising the need 
for far-reaching reforms. Regarding energy, the 
priority will be to expand the transmission net-
works connecting the north and south of Ger-
many, to create storage capacity for renewable 
Regardless of which parties form the new 
coalition, the principal direction of German 
policy will be maintained. European matters 
and energy transformation policy will be 
most important in the 2013-2017 term.
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electricity, and to provide funding for the trans-
formation (i.e. to convert the German power in-
dustry to green technologies) without placing 
undue burdens on households and businesses. 
The Energiewende (energy transformation) is 
seen by all the parties which could potentially 
create a governing coalition as a German export 
product. If an SPD/Green coalition is created, it 
is expected to create a separate Ministry of En-
ergy. Major changes may occur in the areas of 
integration and fiscal policy. If the SPD and the 
Greens form the government, dual citizenship 
for non-EU nationals born on German territory 
will be legalised, and a minimum wage will be 
introduced. We may also expect an increase in 
tax rates for the highest earners.
APPENDIX
Summary of selected points from the election programmes of those parties which 
could form a coalition













- The introduction of a min-
imum wage, set by social part-
ners in sectors where there is 
no collective bargaining
- Support for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises by 
maintaining labour costs at  
a stable level
- Setting a limit on rent in-
creases for apartments at 15% 
over the next three years
- No agreement on raising 
taxes
- Elimination of so-called tax 
drainage 
- Reducing the number of 
junk contracts and fixed-
term contracts
- Equal pay for men and 
women
- Introduction of a min-
imum wage of at least 
€8.50
- Increase in capital tax
- Increase in capital gains 
tax from 25% to 32%
- Introduction of financial 
transaction tax
- Increase the tax on the 
highest earners
- Lowering tax thresh-
olds for individuals and 
businesses
- Combating so-called 
tax drainage
- Adding a brake on tax 
increases for individuals 
above a certain limit to 
the constitution
- Privatisation of state-
owned enterprises
- Support for small and medi-
um-sized businesses through 
tax credits
- Increase in tax on capital
- Increase the tax on the high-
est earners
- Reducing the number of junk 
and fixed-term contracts
- Equal pay for men and 
women
- Introduction of a minimum 









- Expansion of the electricity 
transmission and storage 
network
- Faster construction of mod-
ern coal- and gas-fired power 
plants
- Increase public acceptance 
of energy transformation by 
creating opportunities for the 
financial participation of citi-
zens in emerging networks
- Increasing energy efficiency
- Promoting a common Euro-
pean energy market
- Improving the safety of Euro-
pean nuclear power plants
- Creating a radioactive waste 
storage facility in Germany
- Greater use of the 
eastern federal states in 
the production of energy 
from renewable sources
- Better coordination and 
management of energy 
transformation
- Reduction of excise duty 
on electricity
- Financial support for 
citizens by increasing 
the energy efficiency of 
buildings
- Covering 20% of heat 
energy from renewable 
sources
- Building up small power 
plants and local struc-
tures
- Reducing the excise 
duty on electricity
- Making renewables 
compulsory as the 
largest share in the 
energy network on the 
common EU energy 
market
- A partnership with 
North African countries 
in the field of energy 
from renewable sources
- Decentralisation of 
energy production
- Increasing competition 
on the German and 
European gas market
- All electricity production 
from renewable energy sourc-
es by 2030
- Modern gas power plants as 
backup during lower wind and 
solar energy production
- Germany as a model region 
in the context of smart grids
- Decentralisation of electricity 
supply
- Increase the participation of 
citizens in the production and 
transport of energy
- Expansion of the transmis-
sion grid
- Total abandonment of coal 
from 2030, and the gradual 
abandonment of oil
- Abolition of privileges and 
subsidies for businesses
- Reduction of energy con-
sumption in private house-
holds
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- The establishment of  
a European banking union
- Strengthening the Europe-
an Commission’s rights to 
oversee national budgets
- The introduction of  
a competitiveness pact, in 
which states pledge to the 
Commission that they will 
undertake specific measures 
to improve competitiveness 
in exchange for aid and loan 
guarantees
- Dismiss the possibility of 
introducing Eurobonds
- Strengthening the role of 
the EU’s High Representative 
for the CFSP
- The granting of a mem-
bership perspective for the 
Western Balkans
- No agreement on Turkey’s 
accession to the EU, both 
because of its unprepared-
ness for membership, as well 
as ‘accession overload’ 
- Giving the German and 
French languages equal 
priority with English in EU 
institutions
- The opportunity to create 
a common fund for the eu-
rozone, to allow some of the 
southern countries to repay 
their debts 
- Comprehensive regula-
tion of financial markets, 
including the strengthening 
of European supervision of 
major banks
- The elimination of the 
electoral threshold in EP 
elections
- The possibility of the trans-
fer of competences from the 
European to the national 
level
- Strengthening the CFSP
- Agreement on the ac-
cession of Turkey and the 
Western Balkan countries to 
the EU
- Rejection of eurobonds
- The right of veto for the 
Bundesbank’s representative 
in the ECB
- Opposition to the creation 
of national funds to save 
banks threatened with col-
lapse in the banking union
- The ultimate goal of inte-
gration should be the estab-
lishment of a federal state
- EP should be given the 
right of legislative initiative
- Direct election of the 
President of the European 
Commission in a general 
election
- Agreement on enlarging 
the EU, on condition the 
candidates are prepared (in-
cluding Turkey and Ukraine), 
and that the EU has the 
capacity to integrate new 
members
- The abolition of visas for 
citizens of the Eastern  
& Southern Partnerships and 
Turkey
- The creation of a common 
eurozone fund to repay the 
debts of the southern states 
- The introduction of Euro-
bonds in the long term
- The possibility of EU en-
largement with the Western 
Balkans and Turkey
- The abolition of visas for 
citizens of the Eastern Part-
nership countries, Russia, 
Kosovo and Turkey
- Legislative initiative for PE
- Selection by the EP of the 
EC’s President
- Grant asylum seekers 
the right to choose which 










- The creation of a new 
partnership agreement with 
Russia to deepen the liber-
alisation of the visa regime 
for businessmen, academics 
and students; strengthening 
cooperation with the Baltics, 
and in the fields of foreign 
and security policy
- To promote a free trade 
agreement with the US
- Strategic partnerships with 
emerging powers
- Development of relations 
with regional organisations 
(ASEAN, MERCOSUR)
- Policy towards Russia 
based on economic, political 
and social dialogue within 
the Partnership for Moderni-
sation, the need for greater 
visa liberalisation
- Strengthen transatlantic 
cooperation through the 
signing of a free-trade 
agreement,
increase cooperation with 
the US in the Middle East, 
and mediate in dialogue 
with Russia
- Strategic partnerships with 
emerging powers
- Strengthening cooperation 
with countries in Africa and 
South America
- Creation of an additional 
body in the Bundestag to 
supervise the government’s 
arms export policy
- Improve current relations 
(especially economic) with 
Russia and conduct a critical 
dialogue on civil rights and 
the abolition of visas
 - Achieving a free trade 
agreement is the strategic 
objective of cooperation 
with the US 
- Expansion of political and 
economic relations with 
emerging powers
- To strengthen defence 
cooperation with Poland 
within the Weimar Triangle
- Restrictive arms export pol-
icy: abolition of the Federal 
Security Council, and export 
decisions should be taken by 
the government unanimous-
ly instead
- Creation of an additional 
body in the Bundestag to 
supervise the government’s 
arms export policy
